Emergency Executive Powers: Not Needed Indefinitely

Zhong, Weifeng; Makridis, Christos; Diddams, James

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3590751

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Emergency Executive Powers: Not Needed Indefinitely

Mercatus Special Edition Policy Brief

6 Pages Posted: 5 May 2020

See all articles by Weifeng Zhong

Weifeng Zhong

Mercatus Center at George Mason University

Arizona State University (ASU) - W.P. Carey School of Business; Stanford University - Stanford Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence; Institute for the Future (IFF), Department of Digital Innovation, School of Business, University of Nicosia

James Diddams

Independent

Date Written: April 17, 2020

Abstract

The US government’s response to the COVID-19 crisis included the exercise of emergency powers to suspend rules and regulations that hindered society’s efforts to mitigate the pandemic. It will be important to rescind or revise many of those regulations after the crisis, but we insist that this goal should be achieved through the legislative process. Effecting regulatory overhaul by extending the emergency powers may call into question the legitimacy of the new policies. Consequently, we recommend amending the National Emergencies Act to end the practice of extending special authorities indefinitely.

Keywords: healthcare, coronavirus, lockdown, emergency powers, coronavirus pandemic, COVID-19, public health, economics, quarantine, economy, economic crisis

JEL Classification: H75, I00, I18

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Zhong, Weifeng and Makridis, Christos and Diddams, James, Emergency Executive Powers: Not Needed Indefinitely (April 17, 2020). Mercatus Special Edition Policy Brief, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3590751 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3590751