Download This PaperDisclosure of Managerial Contract Information in a Vertically Related Market
38 Pages Posted: 29 May 2020
Date Written: May 2, 2020
Abstract
The observability of managerial contract information in duopolies with strategic delegation has been an issue of controversial discussion. In a recent paper, Baik and Lee (2019) endogenize the decision to disclose the details of managerial contracts and show that in equilibrium, the owners of both firms have an incentive to always voluntarily reveal contract information, independent if firms compete in quantities or prices. We study how voluntary disclosure of contract information is affected by the presence of a supplier that provides an input to both firms. We demonstrate that under quantity competition, a partial disclosure equilibrium may occur if product differentiation is low. Disclosing firms punish their managers for sales to soften supplier pricing. Mandating disclosure increases total welfare, but consumer surplus decreases. Under price competition, firms always want to disclose. Finally, firm profits can be higher under price competition than under quantity competition.
Keywords: Voluntary disclosure, strategic incentives, vertically related markets, quantity and price competition
JEL Classification: D82, L13, L22, M41
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