De-Policing: An Updated Empirical Analysis of Crime and Federal Police Reform

Abstract

This Article builds on prior work by empirically analyzing the effect of federal intervention in local police departments on crime and clearance rates, using updated data and methodologies.  

Congress passed 34 U.S.C. § 12601 (formerly 42 U.S.C. § 14141) in 1994 to give the United States Attorney General the authority to seek equitable relief against local and state law enforcement agencies engaged in patterns or practices of misconduct. Since its passage, the Department of Justice has investigated and intervened into dozens of American police departments, including some of the largest police departments in the country. Federal intervention represents one of the most significant, and arguably effective, forms of police reform. However, critics have argued that this top-down reform process may unintentionally cause officers to pullback on enforcement, thereby contributing to higher crime rates. Some have labeled this theory the de-policing hypothesis. Prior studies have attempted to test this theory, often with inconsistent results. 

Using updated methods and a significantly larger dataset, this Article attempts to re-examine the empirical support for the de-policing hypothesis in federal intervention cases. We find no evidence of de-policing after federal intervention. In fact, years after federal intervention, we find evidence that crime rates in cities targeted for federal intervention declined relative to our control group.  

These findings have important implications for the literature on police reform and the empirical study of the criminal justice system. They suggest that there need not be a compromise between the protection of constitutional rights and public safety.

Keywords: police, police accountability, federal intervention, pattern or practice, civil rights, police abuse, § 12601, crime, de-policing