3688 Nanhai Road, Nanshan District
Shenzhen, Guangdong 518060
China
Shenzhen University
Contest Design, Disclosure Policy, Innovation, Procurement, Research Tournament
Discrimination, mechanism design, optimal auction, re�serve price
contest, all-pay auction, stochastic abilities, disclosure policies
Elimination Tournaments, Psychological Momentum, Contest Design
All-Pay Auction, Contest, Information Disclosure, Bayesian Persuasion, Stochastic Valuations
Matching, Externalities, General Equilibrium, Fixed Point, Efficiency.
contest, all-pay auction, stochastic abilities, bid cap, disclosure
contest, all-pay auction, stochastic entry, bid cap, disclosure
contest, stochastic abilities, exclusion principle.
Optimal Subsidization, Participation Costs, Deductible-Cap Subsidization, Platform Economy, Auctions, Contests, Cournot Competition, Network Externalities
Mechanism Design, Symmetry, Fairness, Strategyproof
contests, all-pay auctions, favoritism, information disclosure JEL classification: C72, D44, D82
contest, all-pay auction, stochastic entry, disclosure
Bayesian Persuasion, Full Surplus Extraction, All-Pay Auction, Affiliated Types, Multi-Unit Auction
all-pay auction, interdependent valuation, affiliation, bid cap
All-pay auction, Affiliation, Stochastic participation, Disclosure policies
Matching, Assignment, Externalities, Cournot Competition, Labor Market, Sorting
contest, all-pay auction, stochastic entry, asymmetric entry, disclosure
All-Pay Auction, Contest, Disclosure, Stochastic Abilities
This paper is superseded by: "Optimal Subsidy Design for Verifiable Participation Costs"
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5368769
Auctions, Participation costs, Subsidization
