Zurich
Switzerland
Offchain Labs
Smart Contracts, Deposit Design, Costly State Verification
Automated Market Maker, Market Microstructure, Decentralized Finance, Blockchain
Matching; Random Assignments; Priority-based Allocation; Constrained Efficiency; Pseudo-Market; Welfare Theorem
voting; referenda; rational behavior
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Turnout - Referenda - Elections - Pivotal voting - Private value
voting, committees, cost sharing, information acquisition, reward scheme, monetary transfers
voting, decoy votes, adversary, electronic voting, attacks, lemons market
voting, committee, information acquisition, monetary transfers, majority rule, incomplete social contracts
Voting; E-Voting; Security
Costly voting - Delegation - Rational voters - Governance - Liquid democracy - Blockchain
Lemons market - Partition - Signaling - Commitment - Market maker - Vote-buying - Lobbying - Decoy ballots