ETH Zürich - CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich
Smart Contracts, Deposit Design, Costly State Verification
voting; referenda; rational behavior
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Turnout - Referenda - Elections - Pivotal voting - Private value
Matching; Random Assignments; Priority-based Allocation; Constrained Efficiency; Pseudo-Market; Welfare Theorem
voting, decoy votes, adversary, electronic voting, attacks, lemons market
voting, committees, cost sharing, information acquisition, reward scheme, monetary transfers
Voting; E-Voting; Security
Lemons market - Partition - Signaling - Commitment - Market maker - Vote-buying - Lobbying - Decoy ballots
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