Tepper School of Business
5000 Forbes Ave
Pittsburgh, PA 15213
United States
http://www.liyanshi.com
Carnegie Mellon University
SSRN RANKINGS
in Total Papers Citations
executive compensation, dynamic moral hazard, general equilibrium, endogenous outside options, contracting externalities D86, G34, G32, M12
Repurchase Agreement, Collateralized Debt, Private Information, Optimal Contracts
On-The-Job Search, Noncompete Contract, Dynamic Contract, Labor Reallocation, Investment Holdup
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COVID-19, Optimal quarantine, Optimal testing, Welfare cost of quarantines
