Rochester, MI 48309-4401
United States
Oakland University - Department of Economics
Optimal Pricing, 2nd Degree Price Discrimination, Menu Pricing, Revelation Principle, Spence-Mirrlees Condition
Optimal Pricing, 2nd Degree Price Discrimination, Fast Food, Menu Pricing, Supersizing, Revelation Principle, Spence-Mirrlees Condition
First-price auction, second-price auction, revenue comparison
Covid-19 pandemic, Higher-education, Vaccine Mandate
Auctions, Bayesian Game, Collusion, Core, Partition Form Game, Characteristic Function
start-up, inventors, asymmetric information
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all-pay auctions, asymmetric information, information advantage
asymmetric information, bid caps, common-value all-pay auctions, information advantage
