Agenda Power in Brazil's Camara Dos Deputados, 1989-98

World Politics, Vol. 55, pp. 550-78, July 2003

30 Pages Posted: 26 Jul 2007  

Gary W. Cox

Stanford University

Mathew D. McCubbins

Department of Political Science and Law School, Duke University

Octavio Amorim Neto

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Abstract

In this article we explore the proposition that all majority governments in systems allowing joint tenure of legislative and executive posts constitute what we call parliamentary agenda cartels. We define what an agenda cartel is, describe how to detect cartels empirically, and provide background information on Brazil's Chamber of Deputies. We then provide evidence on the structure of veto power in Brazil and test the cartel thesis. We show that Brazil has experienced only one true majority government, that of Cardoso, since the promulgation of the newly democratic constitution in October 1988. Moreover, it is only under Cardoso that an agenda cartel formed.

Keywords: agenda control, Camara dos Deputados, legislatures, legislative agenda, Brazil

JEL Classification: D72, N40

Suggested Citation

Cox, Gary W. and McCubbins, Mathew D. and Neto, Octavio Amorim, Agenda Power in Brazil's Camara Dos Deputados, 1989-98. World Politics, Vol. 55, pp. 550-78, July 2003. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1002807

Gary W. Cox (Contact Author)

Stanford University ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305
United States
650-723-4278 (Phone)

Mathew D. McCubbins

Department of Political Science and Law School, Duke University ( email )

210 Science Drive
Box 90362
Durham, NC 27708
United States

Octavio Amorim Neto

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

No Address Available

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