World Politics, Vol. 55, pp. 550-78, July 2003
30 Pages Posted: 26 Jul 2007
In this article we explore the proposition that all majority governments in systems allowing joint tenure of legislative and executive posts constitute what we call parliamentary agenda cartels. We define what an agenda cartel is, describe how to detect cartels empirically, and provide background information on Brazil's Chamber of Deputies. We then provide evidence on the structure of veto power in Brazil and test the cartel thesis. We show that Brazil has experienced only one true majority government, that of Cardoso, since the promulgation of the newly democratic constitution in October 1988. Moreover, it is only under Cardoso that an agenda cartel formed.
Keywords: agenda control, Camara dos Deputados, legislatures, legislative agenda, Brazil
JEL Classification: D72, N40
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Cox, Gary W. and McCubbins, Mathew D. and Neto, Octavio Amorim, Agenda Power in Brazil's Camara Dos Deputados, 1989-98. World Politics, Vol. 55, pp. 550-78, July 2003. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1002807