Regulation of NGN: Structural Separation, Access Regulation, or No Regulation at All?

21 Pages Posted: 23 May 2008

See all articles by Fabian Kirsch

Fabian Kirsch

TU Berlin - Workgroup for Infrastructure Policy (WIP); TU Berlin - Graduate School for Human Centric Communication

Christian von Hirschhausen

German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin) - Department of International Economics

Date Written: March 2008

Abstract

Since the introduction of Next Generation Networks (NGNs) by telecommunication network operators, national regulators have begun to adapt their access regulation regimes to the new technological conditions. The regulatory reactions gravitate towards three distinct regulatory trajectories: unregulated competition, access regulation, and structural separation. We first analyze the extent of market power in access Networks in NGNs from a technological perspective. Second, we use case studies to identify patterns between technological and market conditions and regulators' reactions in selected countries. We find that market power in the access network is likely to prevail. Regulatory reactions differ with the extent of infrastructure competition and the regulators position in the trade-off between promoting investment and protecting competition.

Keywords: Next Generation Network, deregulation, access regulation, structural separation

JEL Classification: L51

Suggested Citation

Kirsch, Fabian and von Hirschhausen, Christian, Regulation of NGN: Structural Separation, Access Regulation, or No Regulation at All? (March 2008). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1136051 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1136051

Fabian Kirsch (Contact Author)

TU Berlin - Workgroup for Infrastructure Policy (WIP) ( email )

Straße des 17. Juni 135
Berlin, 10623
Germany

TU Berlin - Graduate School for Human Centric Communication ( email )

Straße des 17. Juni 135
Berlin, 10623
Germany

Christian Von Hirschhausen

German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin) - Department of International Economics ( email )

Mohrenstraße 58
Berlin, 10117
Germany
+49-30-89789-343 (Phone)
+49/30/897 89 -200 (Fax)

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