Existence and Efficiency of Nash Equilibria under Deterministic Voting

16 Pages Posted: 24 Jul 2008

See all articles by Aristotelis Boukouras

Aristotelis Boukouras

University of Leicester

Kostas Koufopoulos

University of Warwick - Finance Group

Date Written: July 23, 2008

Abstract

This paper considers an economy with a public good where a decision must be made both about the level of the public good and the taxation imposed on each citizen (multidimensional policy space). In this context, we derive two interesting results: i) we show that a Nash equilibrium exists under deterministic voting, ii) we show that political competition is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the elimination of political rents (efficiency). In our political game a Nash equilibrium (under deterministic voting) exists because politicians commit to the level of the public good but not to the level of taxation. However, because of the lack of commitment to the taxation level, politicians are able to overtax citizens, provide an inefficiently low level of the public good and extract rents, even under political competition. Therefore, efficiency requires appropriate political institutions (maximum taxation constraint).

Keywords: Lindahl allocation, political competition, political rents, voting games

JEL Classification: D02, D62, D72, H41

Suggested Citation

Boukouras, Aristotelis and Koufopoulos, Kostas, Existence and Efficiency of Nash Equilibria under Deterministic Voting (July 23, 2008). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1172346 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1172346

Aristotelis Boukouras

University of Leicester ( email )

University Road
Leicester, LE1 7RH
United Kingdom

Kostas Koufopoulos (Contact Author)

University of Warwick - Finance Group ( email )

Gibbet Hill Rd
Coventry, CV4 7AL
Great Britain

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