Change, Consolidation, and Competition in Health Care Markets

48 Pages Posted: 4 Sep 1998

See all articles by Martin Gaynor

Martin Gaynor

Carnegie Mellon University; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Leverhulme Centre for Market and Public Organisation

Deborah Haas-Wilson

Smith College

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: July 24, 1998


The health care industry is being transformed. Large firms are merging and acquiring other firms. Alliances and contractual relations between players in this market are shifting rapidly. Within the next few years, many markets are predicted to be dominated by a few large firms. Antitrust enforcement authorities like the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, as well as courts and legislators at both the federal and state levels, are struggling with the implications of these changes for the nature and consequences of competition in health care markets. In this paper we summarize the nature of the changes in the structure of the health care industry. We will focus on the markets for health insurance, hospital services, and physician services. We will discuss the potential implications of the restructuring of the health care industry for competition, efficiency, and public policy. As will become apparent, this area offers a number of intriguing questions for inquisitive researchers.

JEL Classification: I11, L1, L4

Suggested Citation

Gaynor, Martin and Haas-Wilson, Deborah, Change, Consolidation, and Competition in Health Care Markets (July 24, 1998). Available at SSRN: or

Martin Gaynor (Contact Author)

Carnegie Mellon University ( email )

H. John Heinz III School of Public Policy
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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Leverhulme Centre for Market and Public Organisation

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Deborah Haas-Wilson

Smith College ( email )

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United States
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413-585-3635 (Fax)

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