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Incentives and China's New Antimonopoly Law

Fei Deng

National Economic Research Associates (NERA)

Gregory K. Leonard

Edgeworth Economics

November 22, 2008

Antitrust Magazine, Vol. 22, No. 2, 2008

The People's Republic of China recently enacted a new, comprehensive Antimonopoly Law (AML) that will go into effect in August 2008. As written, the AML is largely consistent with the antitrust laws of the United States and European Union, with a few exceptions. However, the AML only articulates the broad principles that will guide antitrust enforcement in China. The details of how antitrust enforcement will actually be implemented were left for future development. Thus, a number of questions remain open, some of which arise out of the idiosyncratic nature of the Chinese political and economic environment. Who will be responsible for antitrust enforcement? Will the Chinese antitrust enforcers be able to cope with administrative monopolies? Will the AML be used to disadvantage multinational companies rather than to enhance competition? To what extent will the AML and its penalties deter companies from engaging in anticompetitive conduct? Central to the answer to each of these questions are the underlying incentives - to companies and the Chinese antitrust enforcers - that have either been created by the AML, or were a motivation for developing the AML in the first place.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 5

Keywords: Antitrust Policy, China

JEL Classification: L4, K21

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Date posted: November 23, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Deng, Fei and Leonard, Gregory K., Incentives and China's New Antimonopoly Law (November 22, 2008). Antitrust Magazine, Vol. 22, No. 2, 2008. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1305627

Contact Information

Fei Deng
National Economic Research Associates (NERA) ( email )
One Front Street, Suite 2600
San Francisco, CA 94111
United States
Gregory K. Leonard (Contact Author)
Edgeworth Economics ( email )
333 Bush St.
Suite 1450
San Francisco, CA 94104
United States
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