Monotone Matching in Perfect and Imperfect Worlds

65 Pages Posted: 13 Jan 1999

See all articles by Patrick Legros

Patrick Legros

Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES); Northeastern University, department of economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Andrew F. Newman

Boston University - Department of Economics

Abstract

We study frictionless matching models in large production economies with and without market imperfections and/or incentive problems. We provide necessary and sufficient distribution-free conditions for monotone matching which depend on the relationship between what we call the segregation payoff--a generalization of the individually rational payoff--and the feasible set for a pair of types. Our approach yields some new techniques for computing equilibria, particularly when utility is not transferable. It also helps to underscore the effects of imperfections, which have two distinct effects that are relevant for equilibrium matching patterns: they can overwhelm the complementarity properties of the production technology and they can introduce nontransferabilities that make equilibrium matching inefficient. We also use our framework to reveal the source of differences in the comparative static properties of some models in the literature and to explore the effects of distribution on the equilibrium matching pattern.

JEL Classification: D83

Suggested Citation

Legros, Patrick and Newman, Andrew F., Monotone Matching in Perfect and Imperfect Worlds. Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), ETA Working Paper No. 58.98; Columbia Univ Econ Dept Discussion Paper No. 9798-14. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=135595 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.135595

Patrick Legros (Contact Author)

Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES) ( email )

Ave. Franklin D Roosevelt, 50 - C.P. 114
Brussels, B-1050
Belgium
+32 2 650 4219/3 (Phone)
+32 2 650 4475 (Fax)

Northeastern University, department of economics ( email )

301 Lake Hall
Boston, MA 02115
United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Andrew F. Newman

Boston University - Department of Economics ( email )

270 Bay State Road
Boston, MA 02215
United States
617-358-4354 (Phone)
617-353-4143 (Fax)

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