Fiscal Behaviour in the European Union: Rules, Fiscal Decentralization and Government Indebtedness
47 Pages Posted: 7 May 2009
Date Written: May 7, 2009
Abstract
We assess the fiscal behaviour in the European Union countries for the period 1990-2005 via the responsiveness of budget balances to several determinants. The results show that the existence of effective fiscal rules, the degree of public spending decentralization, and the electoral cycle can impinge on the country’s fiscal position. Furthermore, the results also support the responsiveness of primary balances to government indebtedness.
Keywords: fiscal regimes, fiscal rules, fiscal decentralization, European Union, panel Data
JEL Classification: C23, E62, H62
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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