GATT Art. XV: Exchange Arrangements

MAX PLANCK COMMENTARIES ON WORLD TRADE LAW, Vol. 5, Rüdiger Wolfrum, Peter-Tobias Stoll, eds., Koninklijke Brill NV, 2009

Georgetown Law and Economics Research Paper No. 1507253

11 Pages Posted: 17 Nov 2009 Last revised: 30 Jul 2010

See all articles by Andrew D. Mitchell

Andrew D. Mitchell

University of Melbourne - Law School

Elizabeth Sheargold

University of Wollongong

Date Written: July 29, 2010

Abstract

This is a commentary on GATT Article XV: Exchange Arrangements. These exchange agreements are the multilateral rules on currency exchange systems that are administered by the IMF and codified in the Articles of Agreement of the IMF, as well as arrangements that may be made between the WTO and one of its Members if that is not also a member of the IMF (a “special exchange agreement”). Art. XV GATT is the “cornerstone” of the relationship between the IMF and the WTO, setting out the basis for co-operation between the two organisations. The purpose of the article is to give the reader a comprehensive and concise insight into the meaning of GATT Article XV.

Keywords: GATT Article XV, Exchange Agreements, Exchange Controls and Trade Restrictions, The WTO and the IMF

JEL Classification: F13, F33

Suggested Citation

Mitchell, Andrew D. and Sheargold, Elizabeth, GATT Art. XV: Exchange Arrangements (July 29, 2010). MAX PLANCK COMMENTARIES ON WORLD TRADE LAW, Vol. 5, Rüdiger Wolfrum, Peter-Tobias Stoll, eds., Koninklijke Brill NV, 2009 ; Georgetown Law and Economics Research Paper No. 1507253. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1507253

Andrew D. Mitchell (Contact Author)

University of Melbourne - Law School ( email )

University Square
185 Pelham Street, Carlton
Victoria, Victoria 3010
Australia
+61383441098 (Phone)
+61393472392 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.unimelb.edu.au/staff/Andrew%20Mitchell

Elizabeth Sheargold

University of Wollongong ( email )

Northfields Avenue
Wollongong, New South Wales 2522
Australia

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