Issue Linkage, Delegation, and International Policy Cooperation

20 Pages Posted: 11 May 1999

See all articles by Giancarlo Spagnolo

Giancarlo Spagnolo

Stockholm School of Economics (SITE); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); University of Rome 'Tor Vergata'; EIEF

Date Written: March 16, 1999

Abstract

How many international agreements should there be, and who should sign them? When policy issues are separable, linking them in a "grand international agreement" facilitates policy cooperation by reallocating slack enforcement power. When policy issues are substitutes, issue linkage facilitates policy cooperation also by increasing the amount of available enforcement power. The contrary happens when issues are complements. Then a better strategy can be to delegate policy issues to different, independent national agencies with the same objectives than governments. Constitutional rules that permit credible delegation to agencies with different objectives than governments further facilitate international cooperation by generating stronger credible threats. Implications for multilateral agreements are discussed.

JEL Classification: E61, F13, F42, H77

Suggested Citation

Spagnolo, Giancarlo, Issue Linkage, Delegation, and International Policy Cooperation (March 16, 1999). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=163173 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.163173

Giancarlo Spagnolo (Contact Author)

Stockholm School of Economics (SITE) ( email )

P.O. Box 6501
Stockholm
Sweden

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/giancarlospagnoloshomepage/

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

University of Rome 'Tor Vergata' ( email )

Faculty of Economics - DEI
Via Columbia 2
Rome, RM 00133
Italy

EIEF ( email )

Via Due Macelli, 73
Rome, 00187
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://WWW.EIEF.IT

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