Download This PaperSpeculation and Hedging in Segmented Markets
Review of Financial Studies, 2014, 27(3): 881-922
50 Pages Posted: 21 Nov 2010 Last revised: 26 Feb 2016
Date Written: May 17, 2013
Abstract
We analyze a model where traders have different trading opportunities and learn information from prices. The difference in trading opportunities implies that different traders may have different trading motives when trading in the same market -- some trade for speculation and others for hedging -- and thus they may respond to the same information in opposite directions. This implies that adding more informed traders may reduce price informativeness and therefore provides a source for learning complementarities leading to multiple equilibria and price jumps. Our model is relevant to various realistic settings and helps to understand a variety of modern financial markets.
Keywords: Speculation, Hedging, Market Segmentation, Price Informativeness, Information Acquisition, Asset Prices
JEL Classification: G14, G12, G11, D82
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Itay Goldstein
University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School - Finance Department ( email )
The Wharton School
3620 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
215-746-0499 (Phone)
Yan Li
Temple University - Fox School of Business and Management ( email )
Philadelphia, PA 19122
United States
Liyan Yang (Contact Author)
University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management ( email )
105 St. George Street
Toronto, Ontario M5S 3E6 M5S1S4
Canada
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