Contracting with Asymmetric Demand Information in Supply Chains
21 Pages Posted: 26 Nov 2010 Last revised: 15 Nov 2012
Date Written: November 15, 2008
When a retailer holds no private information, a powerful supplier can use several contract types to extract for herself the first-best channel profit, leaving the retailer nothing but his reservation profit. In the case where the retailer holds private information on the probability distribution of market demand, most well analyzed contracts do not allow the supplier to achieve for herself the first-best channel profit. In equilibrium, the retailer is able to extract an information rent above his reservation profit, and the overall channel may deviate from its first-best solution. This paper shows that using judicially designed wholesale price contracts involving a buyback policy, a supplier can theoretically avoid paying any information rent to the privately informed retailer, and, at the same time, can extract all the first-best channel profit.
Keywords: contract design, screening, buyback contract
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