The Limits of EU Hedge Fund Regulation

(2011) 5:2 Law and Financial Markets Review 119-127

Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 8/2011

27 Pages Posted: 12 Feb 2011 Last revised: 10 Jan 2017

See all articles by Dan Awrey

Dan Awrey

Cornell Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute

Date Written: February 8, 2011

Abstract

This brief article examines the mechanics of the recently adopted EU Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive. On balance, the results of this examination are not encouraging. The EU has failed to mount a persuasive case for why the Directive represents an improvement over existing national regulatory regimes or prevailing market practices in several key areas. Furthermore, by attempting to shoehorn an economically, strategically and operationally diverse population of financial institutions into a single, artificial class of regulated actors, the EU has established what is in many respects a conceptually muddled regulatory regime. Most importantly, however, the Directive’s approach toward the amelioration of the potential systemic risks associated with alternative investment funds manifests an inherent and ultimately fatal structural flaw. This flaw punctuates the necessity of a globally coordinated response toward macro-prudential risks arising within a globally integrated financial system.

Keywords: Shadow banking, hedge funds, alternative investment funds, financial regulation, systemic risk, EU, directive

Suggested Citation

Awrey, Dan, The Limits of EU Hedge Fund Regulation (February 8, 2011). (2011) 5:2 Law and Financial Markets Review 119-127, Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 8/2011, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1757719

Dan Awrey (Contact Author)

Cornell Law School ( email )

Myron Taylor Hall
Cornell University
Ithaca, NY 14853-4901
United States

European Corporate Governance Institute ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

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