Compliance with the Anti-Trafficking Protocol

European Journal of Political Economy 28, pp. 249-265

39 Pages Posted: 10 Feb 2011 Last revised: 22 Jul 2016

See all articles by Seo-Young Cho

Seo-Young Cho

University of Marburg - School of Business & Economics

Krishna Chaitanya Vadlamannati

University of Goettingen (Göttingen) - Department of Economics

Date Written: June 1, 2012

Abstract

The Anti-trafficking Protocol reflects the interests of the major countries. Due to the high costs of compliance, countries will strategically select those obligations that will satisfy the major countries most efficiently with lower costs of compliance. Among the three main obligations of the Protocol – prevention, protection and prosecution – we predict that ratification leads to the strongest effect on compliance with the prevention policy because prevention reflects the key interests of the major countries, while triggering less domestic resistance and political costs to implement. Therefore, it is the most ‘efficient’ form of compliance. We empirically test this hypothesis by employing panel data from 147 countries during the period of 2001–2009. As the theory predicts, the ratification of the Protocol has the strongest effect on the prevention policy of a member state compared to protection and prosecution.

Keywords: Human trafficking, International anti-trafficking law, compliance

JEL Classification: F22, F53, K33

Suggested Citation

Cho, Seo-Young and Vadlamannati, Krishna Chaitanya, Compliance with the Anti-Trafficking Protocol (June 1, 2012). European Journal of Political Economy 28, pp. 249-265, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1757761 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1757761

Seo-Young Cho (Contact Author)

University of Marburg - School of Business & Economics ( email )

Barfuessertor 2
Marburg, Hessen 35037
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.economics-human-trafficking.org/

Krishna Chaitanya Vadlamannati

University of Goettingen (Göttingen) - Department of Economics ( email )

Platz der Goettinger Sieben 3
Goettingen, 37073
Germany

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