Do Call Prices and the Underlying Stock Always Move in the Same Direction?

Posted: 14 Oct 1999

See all articles by Zhiwu Chen

Zhiwu Chen

University of Hong Kong, Faculty of Business Economics (HKU Business School); Asia Global Institute, University of Hong Kong

Gurdip Bakshi

Fox School of Business; Temple University - Fox School of Business and Management

Charles Cao

Pennsylvania State University

Abstract

This article empirically analyzes some properties shared by all one-dimensional diffusion option models. Using S&P 500 options, we find that when sampled intraday (or inter-day), (i) call (put) prices often go down (up) even as the underlying price goes up, and (ii) call and put prices often increase, or decrease, together. Our results are valid after controlling for time-decay and market microstructure effects. Therefore, one-dimensional diffusion option models cannot be completely consistent with observed option-price dynamics; options are not redundant securities, nor ideal hedging instruments---puts and the underlying asset prices may go down together.

JEL Classification: G10, G12, G13

Suggested Citation

Chen, Zhiwu and Bakshi, Gurdip S. and Bakshi, Gurdip S. and Cao, Charles, Do Call Prices and the Underlying Stock Always Move in the Same Direction?. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=183108

Zhiwu Chen

University of Hong Kong, Faculty of Business Economics (HKU Business School) ( email )

Pokfulam Road
Hong Kong
Hong Kong

Asia Global Institute, University of Hong Kong ( email )

Room 328-348, Main Building
The University of Hong Kong
Pokfulam
Hong Kong

Gurdip S. Bakshi

Fox School of Business ( email )

Department of Finance
Philadelphia, PA 19022
United States
215-204-6117 (Phone)
tuk40718@temple.edu (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/view/gurdipbakshi1

Temple University - Fox School of Business and Management ( email )

Philadelphia, PA 19122
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/view/gurdipbakshi1

Charles Cao (Contact Author)

Pennsylvania State University ( email )

Department of Finance
Smeal College of Business
University Park, PA 16802
United States
814-865-7891 (Phone)
814-865-3362 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.personal.psu.edu/qxc2/cao.html

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