Self-Serving Dictators

9 Pages Posted: 9 Jun 2011

See all articles by Geir B. Asheim

Geir B. Asheim

University of Oslo - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Leif Helland

BI Norwegian Business School - Department of Economics

Jon Hovi

University of Oslo - Department of Political Science

Bjørn Høyland

Center for International Climate and Environmental Research (CICERO)

Date Written: June 9, 2011

Abstract

We provide experimental evidence of self-serving fairness ideals in a dictator game. Our design includes treatments where funds can be transferred in two ways to the one player and in one way to the other. Two methods for transferring funds to the recipient produce generosity levels similar to those of the regular dictator game. However, two methods for transferring funds to the dictator reduce her generosity substantially. Hence, the fairness ideal adopted by dictators appears to be equal share per individual in the former case (as in the regular dictator game), and equal share per transfer method in the latter case.

Suggested Citation

Asheim, Geir B. and Helland, Leif and Hovi, Jon and Høyland, Bjørn, Self-Serving Dictators (June 9, 2011). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1860884 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1860884

Geir B. Asheim

University of Oslo - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 1095 Blindern
N-0317 Oslo
Norway
+47-2285 5498 (Phone)
+47-2285 5035 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

Leif Helland (Contact Author)

BI Norwegian Business School - Department of Economics ( email )

Nydalsveien 37
Oslo, 0484
Norway

Jon Hovi

University of Oslo - Department of Political Science ( email )

Eilert Sundts hus 7th floor
Moltke Moes vei 31
Oslo, 0851
Norway

Bjørn Høyland

Center for International Climate and Environmental Research (CICERO) ( email )

P.O. Box 1129 Blindern
Oslo, N-0317
United States

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