Competing Mechanisms, Exclusive Clauses and the Revelation Principle

10 Pages Posted: 5 Jul 2011

See all articles by Andrea Attar

Andrea Attar

Toulouse School of Economics; University of Roma Tor Vergata

Eloisa Campioni

University of Rome Tor Vergata - Dept. of Economics and Finance

Gwenael Piaser

Universite du Luxembourg

Date Written: July 5, 2011

Abstract

We consider multiple-principal multiple-agent games of incomplete information in which each agent can at most participate with one principal. In such contexts, we show that the restriction to direct truthful mechanisms involves a loss of generality, even if one only focuses on pure strategy equilibria. However, the traditional Revelation Principle retains its power in games with a single agent.

Keywords: Competing Mechanisms, Exclusivity

JEL Classification: D82

Suggested Citation

Attar, Andrea and Campioni, Eloisa and Piaser, Gwenael, Competing Mechanisms, Exclusive Clauses and the Revelation Principle (July 5, 2011). CEIS Working Paper No. 201. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1879123 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1879123

Andrea Attar (Contact Author)

Toulouse School of Economics

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Toulouse, F 31000
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+33 5 61128578 (Phone)

University of Roma Tor Vergata ( email )

2 Via Columbia
00100 Rome
Italy

Eloisa Campioni

University of Rome Tor Vergata - Dept. of Economics and Finance ( email )

Italy

Gwenael Piaser

Universite du Luxembourg ( email )

148, avenue de la Faïencerie
Luxembourg, L-1511
Luxembourg
+ 352 46 66 44 6811 (Fax)

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