The Supply of Corporate Directors and Board Independence

Review of Financial Studies 26(6), 1561-1605

ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 315/2011

61 Pages Posted: 4 Aug 2011 Last revised: 6 Feb 2020

See all articles by Anzhela Knyazeva

Anzhela Knyazeva

Independent; New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business

Diana Knyazeva

Independent; Securities and Exchange Commission

Ronald W. Masulis

University of New South Wales, Sydney; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Financial Research Network (FIRN); National University of Singapore (NUS) - Asian Bureau of Finance and Economic Research (ABFER)

Date Written: March 26, 2013

Abstract

Empirical evidence on the relations between board independence and board decisions and firm performance is generally confounded by serious endogeneity issues. We circumvent these endogeneity problems by demonstrating the strong impact of the local director labor market on board composition. Specifically, we show that proximity to larger pools of local director talent leads to more independent boards for all but the largest quartile of S&P1500. Using local director pools as an instrument for board independence, we document that board independence has a positive effect on firm value and operating performance and CEO fraction of incentive based pay and turnover.

Keywords: board of directors, board expertise, director labor market, location, firm value, firm performance, CEO compensation

JEL Classification: G30, G34

Suggested Citation

Knyazeva, Anzhela and Knyazeva, Diana and Masulis, Ronald W., The Supply of Corporate Directors and Board Independence (March 26, 2013). Review of Financial Studies 26(6), 1561-1605, ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 315/2011, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1904730 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1904730

New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business ( email )

44 West 4th Street
Suite 9-160
New York, NY NY 10012
United States

Diana Knyazeva

Independent ( email )

Securities and Exchange Commission

100 F Street, NE
Washington, DC 20549
United States

Ronald W. Masulis

University of New South Wales, Sydney ( email )

UNSW Business School
High St
Sydney, NSW 2052
Australia
612-9385-5860 (Phone)
612-9385-6347 (Fax)

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Financial Research Network (FIRN)

C/- University of Queensland Business School
St Lucia, 4071 Brisbane
Queensland
Australia

HOME PAGE: http://www.firn.org.au

National University of Singapore (NUS) - Asian Bureau of Finance and Economic Research (ABFER) ( email )

BIZ 2 Storey 4, 04-05
1 Business Link
Singapore, 117592
Singapore

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
1,005
Abstract Views
9,268
rank
23,883
PlumX Metrics