Credit Rating Agencies, the Sovereign Debt Crisis and Competition Law

42 Pages Posted: 15 Aug 2011 Last revised: 2 Sep 2011

See all articles by Nicolas Petit

Nicolas Petit

University of Liege - School of Law; Hoover Institution; University of South Australia - School of Law

Date Written: August 17, 2011

Abstract

This paper explores the possibility of remedial intervention against the credit rating oligopoly under the competition rules. It is divided in six parts. Following an introduction, Part II provides an overview of the credit rating industry. Part III demonstrates that there is a possible economic case for antitrust intervention against the credit rating agencies ("CRAs"). Part IV examines the doctrines of competition law that could be applied against CRAs. Part V reviews possible remedies. Part VI provides a conclusion. The analysis is conducted on the basis of European Union competition law. Subject to national legal idiosyncrasies, it applies mutatis mutandis to other competition law regimes.

Keywords: Credit rating agencies, antitrust, competition law, financial markets, sovereign debt, oligopoly, dominance, conflict of interest, issuer pays

JEL Classification: K21, L4, G1, G2, G3

Suggested Citation

Petit, Nicolas, Credit Rating Agencies, the Sovereign Debt Crisis and Competition Law (August 17, 2011). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1909910 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1909910

Nicolas Petit (Contact Author)

University of Liege - School of Law ( email )

B-4000 Liege
Belgium

Hoover Institution ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305
United States

University of South Australia - School of Law ( email )

GPO Box 2471
Adelaide SA 5001
Australia

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