Strategic Aspects of Fighting in Alliances

19 Pages Posted: 28 Sep 2011 Last revised: 20 Nov 2015

See all articles by Kai A. Konrad

Kai A. Konrad

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Date Written: September 1, 2011

Abstract

This paper surveys some of the strategic aspects that emerge if players fight in an alliance against an enemy. The survey includes the free-rider problem and the hold-up problem that emerges in the baseline model, the role of supermodularity in alliance members’ effort contributions, the role of budget constraints, the role of information transfer inside the alliance, and the role of in-group favoritism.

Keywords: Alliances, contests, conflict, in-group favoritism

JEL Classification: D72, D74

Suggested Citation

Konrad, Kai A., Strategic Aspects of Fighting in Alliances (September 1, 2011). Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2011-09. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1934765

Kai A. Konrad (Contact Author)

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance ( email )

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, 80539
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.tax.mpg.de/en/pub/home.cfm

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

90-98 Goswell Road
London, EC1V 7RR
United Kingdom

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, 81679
Germany

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, 53072
Germany

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