16 Pages Posted: 14 Dec 2011 Last revised: 14 Apr 2012
Date Written: December 9, 2011
We analyze bargaining over international climate agreements in a setting with incomplete information about abatement costs. Unilateral commitment to high abatement reduces the gains from global cooperation. This reduces the probability of reaching efficient international environmental agreements.
Keywords: mitigation, international climate agreements, bargaining, unilateral advances
JEL Classification: Q54, Q58, F53, H41
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Konrad, Kai A. and Thum, Marcel P., Climate Policy Negotiations with Incomplete Information (December 9, 2011). Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance Working Paper No. 2011-19. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1971638 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1971638