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Climate Policy Negotiations with Incomplete Information

16 Pages Posted: 14 Dec 2011 Last revised: 14 Apr 2012

Kai A. Konrad

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance; Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Marcel P. Thum

Dresden University of Technology - Faculty of Economics and Business Management; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) - Ifo Institute

Date Written: December 9, 2011

Abstract

We analyze bargaining over international climate agreements in a setting with incomplete information about abatement costs. Unilateral commitment to high abatement reduces the gains from global cooperation. This reduces the probability of reaching efficient international environmental agreements.

Keywords: mitigation, international climate agreements, bargaining, unilateral advances

JEL Classification: Q54, Q58, F53, H41

Suggested Citation

Konrad, Kai A. and Thum, Marcel P., Climate Policy Negotiations with Incomplete Information (December 9, 2011). Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance Working Paper No. 2011-19. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1971638 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1971638

Kai A. Konrad (Contact Author)

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance ( email )

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, 80539
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.tax.mpg.de/en/pub/home.cfm

Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB) ( email )

Reichpietschufer 50
Berlin, 10785
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.wzb.eu/mp/fff/people/kai_konrad.en.htm

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

90-98 Goswell Road
London, EC1V 7RR
United Kingdom

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, 81679
Germany

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, 53072
Germany

Marcel Thum

Dresden University of Technology - Faculty of Economics and Business Management ( email )

Mommsenstrasse 13
Dresden, D-01062
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) - Ifo Institute ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, 01069
Germany

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