Climate Policy Negotiations with Incomplete Information

Konrad, Kai A.; Thum, Marcel P.

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1971638

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Climate Policy Negotiations with Incomplete Information

Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance Working Paper No. 2011-19

16 Pages Posted: 14 Dec 2011 Last revised: 14 Apr 2012

See all articles by Kai A. Konrad

Kai A. Konrad

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Marcel P. Thum

Dresden University of Technology - Faculty of Economics and Business Management; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) - Ifo Institute; Institute for Corruption Studies

Date Written: December 9, 2011

Abstract

We analyze bargaining over international climate agreements in a setting with incomplete information about abatement costs. Unilateral commitment to high abatement reduces the gains from global cooperation. This reduces the probability of reaching efficient international environmental agreements.

Keywords: mitigation, international climate agreements, bargaining, unilateral advances

JEL Classification: Q54, Q58, F53, H41

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Konrad, Kai A. and Thum, Marcel, Climate Policy Negotiations with Incomplete Information (December 9, 2011). Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance Working Paper No. 2011-19, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1971638 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1971638