The Strategic Formation of Networks: Experimental Evidence
61 Pages Posted: 20 Jan 2012
Date Written: January 2012
We use a laboratory experiment to explore dynamic network formation in a six-player game where link creation requires mutual consent. The analysis of network outcomes suggests that the process tends to converge to the pairwise-stable (PWS) equilibrium when it exists and not to converge at all when it does not. When multiple PWS equilibria exist, subjects tend to coordinate on the high-payoff one. The analysis at the single choice level indicates that the percentage of myopically rational behavior is generally high. Deviations are more prevalent when actions are reversible, when marginal payoff losses are smaller and when deviations involve excessive links that can be removed unilaterally later on. There is, however, some heterogeneity across subjects.
Keywords: Laboratory experiments, Myopic rationality, Pairwise stable equilibria, Social networks
JEL Classification: C73, C92, D85
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation