Fixing the Patent Office

Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 422

13 Innovation Policy and the Economy 83 (2013)

16 Pages Posted: 16 Mar 2012 Last revised: 24 Apr 2020

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 15, 2012

Abstract

How can we fix the PTO, allowing examiners to effectively distinguish between patentable and unpatentable inventions, without slowing the process to a crawl or wasting a bunch of money? This essay reviews the recent literature and considers a number of proposals and their problems. It concludes that we can make the PTO better, but are unlikely to solve the problem of bad patents altogether. Rather than focusing on adding money, the focus must increasingly turn to understanding and changing applicant and examiner incentives.

JEL Classification: K, K23, O31, O34, O4

Suggested Citation

Lemley, Mark A., Fixing the Patent Office (March 15, 2012). Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 422, 13 Innovation Policy and the Economy 83 (2013), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2023958 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2023958

Mark A. Lemley (Contact Author)

Stanford Law School ( email )

559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
United States

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