Download This PaperRisk Aversion in the Nash Bargaining Problem with ISHARA Utility Functions
11 Pages Posted: 17 Apr 2012
Date Written: April 15, 2012
Abstract
We apply the aggregation property of Identical Shape Harmonic Absolute Risk Aversion (ISHARA) utility functions to analyze the comparative statics properties of a bargaining model with uncertainty. We identify sufficient and necessary conditions under which an increase in one's degree of risk aversion bene fits/hurts one's opponent.
Keywords: bargaining, the Nash Solution, ISHARA Preference, Risk Aversion
JEL Classification: C70, C78
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Li, Sanxi and Yan, Jianye and Sun, Hailin, Risk Aversion in the Nash Bargaining Problem with ISHARA Utility Functions (April 15, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2040548 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2040548
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