Strengthening the Theory of Institutional Corruptions: Broadening, Clarifying, and Measuring

24 Pages Posted: 21 Mar 2013 Last revised: 9 May 2013

See all articles by Donald W. Light

Donald W. Light

Rowan University School of Osteopathic Medicine ; Center for Migration and Development; Institute for Advanced Study

Date Written: March 21, 2013

Abstract

This essay suggests ways to broaden the concept of Institutional Corruption, developed by Dennis Thompson and Lawrence Lessig, so that it can more effectively apply to more institutional settings that do not involve elections or political institutions by drawing on the work of Malcolm Salter on Institutional Corruption in corporations and other non-elected bodies or domains, and by redefining what are now dichotomies (good-evil, corrupt-not corrupt) as the ends of continua. Second, the case is made for drawing on empirical research to develop a matrix measuring the extent, types and degrees of corruption or corrupting behavior, so that IC theory matures from illustrative examples to results from qualitative and quantitative research. Third, the institutional corruption of language, knowledge, and constructions of reality is a special focus, which complements studies of institutions themselves that greatly affects policy and chances for reform.

Keywords: Institutional corruption, corporations, medicine, politics, ethics

Suggested Citation

Light, Donald W., Strengthening the Theory of Institutional Corruptions: Broadening, Clarifying, and Measuring (March 21, 2013). Edmond J. Safra Working Papers, No. 2. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2236391 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2236391

Donald W. Light (Contact Author)

Rowan University School of Osteopathic Medicine ( email )

Cherry Hill, NJ 08003
United States
6092160071 (Phone)

Center for Migration and Development ( email )

200 Wallace Hall
Princeton, NJ 08544
United States
6092160071 (Phone)

Institute for Advanced Study ( email )

1 Einstein Drive
Princeton, NJ 08540
United States
(609) 734-8000 (Phone)

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