The Quasi-Judicial Role of Large Retailers: An Efficiency Hypothesis of Their Relation with Suppliers
University Pompeu Fabra Economics and Business Working Paper No. 445
31 Pages Posted: 15 Jul 2000
The paper explores an efficiency hypothesis regarding the contractual process between large retailers, such as Wal-Mart and Carrefour, and their suppliers. The empirical evidence presented supports the idea that large retailers play a quasi-judicial role, acting as "courts of first instance" in their relationships with suppliers. In this role, large retailers adjust the terms of trade to on-going changes and sanction performance failures, sometimes delaying payments. A potential abuse of their position is limited by the need for re-contracting and preserving their reputations. Suppliers renew their confidence in their retailers on a yearly basis, through writing new contracts. This renovation contradicts the alternative hypothesis that suppliers are expropriated by large retailers as a consequence of specific investments.
Keywords: Retailing, Distribution, Contracts
JEL Classification: L14, L22, L81, K12, M31
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation