Independent Regulators: Theory, Evidence and Reform Proposals

27 Pages Posted: 21 Feb 2014

See all articles by Miguel A. Montoya

Miguel A. Montoya

Instituto Tecnológico de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey

Francesc Trillas

Autonomous University of Barcelona - Department of Economics; University of Navarra - IESE Business School

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Date Written: February 19, 2014

Abstract

Regulatory independence has been proposed as a mechanism to alleviate the commitment problem associated to the sunk nature of investments in network industries, including telecommunications. This paper summarizes the authors’ and others’ work in this field (in a pause to take stock of several years of research), shows new data on the practice of regulation in Latin American telecommunications until 2010, and discusses reform proposals for regulatory agencies. The institution of regulatory independence has costs as well as benefits; the positive and significant impact on industry performance is however most likely quantitatively modest. As a result of the empirical evidence and the assessment of the literature, the reform proposals are meant to improve the effectiveness of the institution.

Keywords: regulation, independence, strategic delegation, telecommunications

JEL Classification: L51

Suggested Citation

Montoya, Miguel A. and Trillas Jané, Francesc, Independent Regulators: Theory, Evidence and Reform Proposals (February 19, 2014). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2398523 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2398523

Miguel A. Montoya (Contact Author)

Instituto Tecnológico de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey ( email )

Av. General Ramón Corona No.2514
Zapopan, Jalisco, 45201
Mexico
523336693000 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.itesm.mx/wps/wcm/connect/Campus/GDA/Guadalajara/

Francesc Trillas Jané

Autonomous University of Barcelona - Department of Economics ( email )

Avda. Diagonal 690
Barcelona, 08034
Spain

University of Navarra - IESE Business School

Avenida Pearson 21
Barcelona, 08034
Spain

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