Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=2489152
 


 



Strategic News Releases in Equity Vesting Months


Alex Edmans


London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Luis Goncalves-Pinto


National University of Singapore

Yanbo Wang


INSEAD

Moqi Groen-Xu


London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE)

May 14, 2015

NBER Working Paper No. w20476
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Finance Working Paper No. 440/2014

Abstract:     
We show that CEOs reallocate news releases into months in which their equity vests, and away from prior and subsequent months. CEOs release 7% more discretionary news in vesting months than in prior months, but there is no di fference for non-discretionary news. These vesting months are determined by equity grants made several years prior, and thus unlikely driven by the current information environment. Discretionary news releases in vesting months lead to favorable media coverage, suggesting they are positive in tone. They also generate a temporary run-up in stock prices and market liquidity, which the CEO exploits by cashing out shortly afterwards.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 50

Keywords: Voluntary Disclosure, Equity Vesting, CEO Incentives, News

JEL Classification: G14, G34


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Date posted: August 30, 2014 ; Last revised: February 16, 2016

Suggested Citation

Edmans, Alex and Goncalves-Pinto, Luis and Wang, Yanbo and Groen-Xu, Moqi, Strategic News Releases in Equity Vesting Months (May 14, 2015). NBER Working Paper No. w20476; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Finance Working Paper No. 440/2014. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2489152 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2489152

Contact Information

Alex Edmans
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting ( email )
Sussex Place
Regent's Park
London NW1 4SA
United Kingdom
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Luis Goncalves-Pinto (Contact Author)
National University of Singapore ( email )
Mochtar Riady Building
15 Kent Ridge Drive
Singapore, 119245
Singapore
HOME PAGE: http://luis.goncalvespinto.com
Yanbo Wang
INSEAD ( email )
Boulevard de Constance
F-77305 Fontainebleau Cedex
France

INSEAD Logo

Moqi Groen-Xu
London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) ( email )
Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
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