Do Market Abuse Rules Violate Human Rights? The Grande Stevens v. Italy Case

24 Pages Posted: 2 Nov 2014 Last revised: 9 Apr 2015

See all articles by Marco Ventoruzzo

Marco Ventoruzzo

Bocconi University - Department of Law; The Pennsylvania State University (University Park) – Penn State Law

Date Written: October 1, 2014

Abstract

The 2014 decision of the European Court of Human Rights in the case “Grande Stevens and Others v. Italy” raises numerous complex issues concerning the regulation of market abuses in Italy, Europe, and also in other systems. The broad questions that the Court of Strasburg addresses, specifically concerning the nature of administrative sanctions and civil penalties, due process in administrative sanctioning procedures, and double jeopardy issues when both criminal and civil sanctions can be inflicted, not only are extremely relevant practically for the current and future regulation of insider trading and market manipulation, but also open a more theoretical discussion on the relationships between the only apparently unrelated fields of human rights and enforcement in financial markets. This Article offers an analysis of the decision, also in the light of future developments due to the recent reform of European law on market abuse, and compares this landmark European decision with corresponding U.S. case law.

Keywords: market abuse, insider trading, market manipulations, European Convention on Human Rights, due process, double jeopardy

JEL Classification: K22

Suggested Citation

Ventoruzzo, Marco, Do Market Abuse Rules Violate Human Rights? The Grande Stevens v. Italy Case (October 1, 2014). European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Law Working Paper No. 269/2014; Bocconi Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2517760. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2517760 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2517760

Marco Ventoruzzo (Contact Author)

Bocconi University - Department of Law ( email )

Via Roentgen, 1
Milan, 20136
Italy

The Pennsylvania State University (University Park) – Penn State Law ( email )

Lewis Katz Building
University Park, PA 16802
United States

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