Optimal Regulation, Executive Compensation and Risk Taking by Financial Institutions

Abstract

We present an equilibrium model of financial institutions to examine the optimal regulation of risk taking. Shareholders provide incentives for management to increase risk to excessive levels. Regulators use caps on asset risk and compensation to achieve the socially optimal risk level. This level trades off costs of risk shifting and costs of bank default. Without regulation, equilibrium risk lies above the optimal level. If information and enforcement are perfect, either policy tool (caps on asset risk or compensation) achieves the optimal risk level. If there are frictions -- if enforcement is limited, if there is uncertainty about the incentives facing management and costs of risk shifting, or if regulation cannot be bank specific -- welfare can be improved by employing both policy tools.

Keywords: bank regulation; fnancial institutions; executive compensation; risk taking; fnancial crises.

JEL Classification: G21, G28