Overconfident Competing Newsvendors

Management Science, Forthcoming

25 Pages Posted: 29 Oct 2015 Last revised: 21 Apr 2021

See all articles by Meng Li

Meng Li

University of Houston - Department of Decision & Information Sciences

Nicholas C. Petruzzi

Pennsylvania State University

Jun Zhang

University of Texas at Dallas - Naveen Jindal School of Management

Date Written: April 20, 2015

Abstract

Overconfidence is one of the most consistent, powerful, and widespread cognitive biases affecting decision making in situations characterized by random outcomes. In this paper, we study the effects and implications of overconfidence in a competitive newsvendor setting. In this context, overconfidence is defined as a cognitive bias in which decision makers behave as though the outcome of an uncertain event is less risky than it really is. This bias unequivocally leads to a lower expected profit for a newsvendor that does not compete on inventory availability. Nevertheless, it can be a positive force for competing newsvendors. Indeed, we find that when the product’s profit margin is high, overconfidence can lead to a first-best outcome. In a similar vein, we also show that the more biased of two competing newsvendors is not necessarily destined to a smaller expected profit than its less biased competitor.

Keywords: overconfidence, decision analysis, competitive newsvendors

Suggested Citation

Li, Meng and Petruzzi, Nicholas C. and Zhang, Jun, Overconfident Competing Newsvendors (April 20, 2015). Management Science, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2596665

Meng Li (Contact Author)

University of Houston - Department of Decision & Information Sciences ( email )

United States

Nicholas C. Petruzzi

Pennsylvania State University ( email )

University Park
State College, PA 16802
United States

Jun Zhang

University of Texas at Dallas - Naveen Jindal School of Management ( email )

P.O. Box 830688
Richardson, TX 75083-0688
United States

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