When Incentives Backfire: Spillover Effects in Food Choice

42 Pages Posted: 25 Aug 2015 Last revised: 13 Mar 2025

See all articles by Manuela Angelucci

Manuela Angelucci

University of Arizona - Department of Economics; University of Michigan - Department of Economics; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Silvia Prina

Case Western Reserve University

Heather Royer

University of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB)

Anya Samek

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Rady School of Management; University of Southern California - Center for Economic and Social Research (CESR)

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Date Written: August 2015

Abstract

How do peers influence the impact of incentives? Despite much work on incentives, little is known about the spillover effects of incentives. We investigate two mechanisms by which these effects can occur: through peers' actions and peers' incentives. In a field experiment on snack choice (grapes versus cookies), we randomize who receives incentives, the fraction of peers incentivized, and whether or not it can be observed that peers' choices are incentivized among over 1,500 children in the school lunchroom. Incentives increase the likelihood of initially choosing grapes. However, peer spillover effects can be large enough to undo these positive effects.

Suggested Citation

Angelucci, Manuela and Angelucci, Manuela and Prina, Silvia and Royer, Heather and Samek, Anya, When Incentives Backfire: Spillover Effects in Food Choice (August 2015). NBER Working Paper No. w21481, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2649749

Manuela Angelucci (Contact Author)

University of Arizona - Department of Economics ( email )

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Tucson, AZ 85721-0108
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University of Michigan - Department of Economics ( email )

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Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

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Silvia Prina

Case Western Reserve University ( email )

Heather Royer

University of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB) ( email )

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Santa Barbara, CA 93106
United States

Anya Samek

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Rady School of Management ( email )

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Rady School of Management
La Jolla, CA 92093-0553
United States

HOME PAGE: http://anyasamek.com

University of Southern California - Center for Economic and Social Research (CESR) ( email )

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Los Angeles, CA 90089-3332
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