Decentralized Governance Structures are Able to Handle CSR Induced Complexity Better

45 Pages Posted: 30 Dec 2015 Last revised: 6 Jan 2016

See all articles by Michael Pirson

Michael Pirson

Fordham University - Gabelli School of Business; Humanistic Management Network; Harvard University

Shann Turnbull

International Institute for Self-Governance; Sustainable Money Working Group; New Garden City Alliance

Date Written: December 30, 2015

Abstract

This article explores how both corporate governance and corporate social responsibility (CSR) can be improved by using insights from complexity theory. Complexity theory reveals that decentralized governance architecture is required for firms to absorb competently the increased intricacies, variety of variables, and objectives introduced by CSR. The current predominant form of centralized governance based on command-and-control hierarchies copes with complexities by reducing data inputs. This approach results in firms reducing their objectives and concerns about CSR. Firms with decentralized “network” form of governance architecture are used to illustrate how the data inputs of each manager can be reduced through the decomposition of decision making labor to improve the capability of the firm intelligently to absorb and manage complexity. Network governance also introduces a division of powers with stakeholders to facilitate shareholder interests obtaining the information and incentive to manage the enterprise to enhance both shareholder value and CSR.

Keywords: Corporate governance, Corporate Social Responsibility, Complexity Theory, Network governance

JEL Classification: M00, M1, M14

Suggested Citation

Pirson, Michael and Turnbull, Shann, Decentralized Governance Structures are Able to Handle CSR Induced Complexity Better (December 30, 2015). Humanistic Management Network, Research Paper Series No. 45/15, Fordham University Schools of Business Research Paper No. 2709413, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2709413 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2709413

Michael Pirson (Contact Author)

Fordham University - Gabelli School of Business ( email )

140 West 62nd Street
New York, NY 10018
United States

Humanistic Management Network ( email )

St. Gallen
Switzerland

Harvard University

1875 Cambridge Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Shann Turnbull

International Institute for Self-Governance ( email )

PO Box 266 Woollahra
Cell: +61418222378
Sydney, New South Wales 1350
Australia
+61293278487 (Phone)
+61280655905 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://independent.academia.edu/ShannTurnbull/CurriculumVitae
SKYPE: shann.turnbull

Sustainable Money Working Group ( email )

Holyoake House
Hanover Street
Manchester, M60 0AS
United Kingdom

New Garden City Alliance ( email )

113 Guinness Court
Snowsfields
London, UK, hello@gardencities.org.uk SE1 3TA
United Kingdom
+44 207 378 1902 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.gardencities.org.uk

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