International Cooperation Over Green Taxes: On the Impossibility of Achieving a Probability-One Gain

27 Pages Posted: 14 Oct 2001

See all articles by Thomas Aronsson

Thomas Aronsson

University of Umea - Department of Economics; Uppsala University

Kenneth Backlund

University of Umea - Department of Economics

Karl-Gustav Lofgren

University of Umea - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Stockholm School of Economics

Date Written: September 2001

Abstract

This paper concerns international coordination of environmental taxation. The main contribution of the paper is to provide a frame-work for dynamic cost benefit analysis of environmental tax reforms in a global economy with transboundary environmental problems. We show that the welfare effects of green tax reform in a multi-country economy may differ substantially from earlier results associated with representative agent models, where the transboundary aspect of the environmental problems is neglected.

Keywords: Environmental Taxation, Global External Effects

JEL Classification: D61, D62, H21, I31

Suggested Citation

Aronsson, Thomas and Backlund, Kenneth and Lofgren, Karl-Gustav, International Cooperation Over Green Taxes: On the Impossibility of Achieving a Probability-One Gain (September 2001). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=284155 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.284155

Thomas Aronsson

University of Umea - Department of Economics ( email )

Umeå University
Umea, SE - 90187
Sweden

Uppsala University

Box 513
Uppsala, 751 20
Sweden

Kenneth Backlund

University of Umea - Department of Economics ( email )

Umeå University
Umea, SE - 90187
Sweden

Karl-Gustav Lofgren (Contact Author)

University of Umea - Department of Economics ( email )

Umeå University
Umea, SE - 90187
Sweden

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Stockholm School of Economics

P.O. Box 6501
Stockholm
SWEDEN

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