Executives’ Legal Records and Insider Trading Activities

40 Pages Posted: 27 Feb 2017

See all articles by Robert H. Davidson

Robert H. Davidson

Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University - Department of Accounting and Information Systems

Aiyesha Dey

Harvard Business School

Abbie J. Smith

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: December 2016

Abstract

We examine how and why insider trading varies across senior executives and their firms. As predicted, the profitability of both purchases and sales are higher for “recordholder” executives (those who have a record of legal infractions), than for other “non-recordholder” executives at the same firms. The profitability of recordholder executives’ purchases and sales decrease significantly with proxies for strong information and governance environments, suggesting that recordholders have a relatively higher propensity to exploit inside information given the opportunity. Finally, our classification of executives (recordholder status) can predict future firm returns and firm-specific news and information events.

Keywords: Legal infractions, insider trading; capital market information

JEL Classification: G30; G34; G38

Suggested Citation

Davidson, Robert H. and Dey, Aiyesha and Smith, Abbie J., Executives’ Legal Records and Insider Trading Activities (December 2016). Fourth Annual Conference on Financial Market Regulation. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2924930 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2924930

Robert H. Davidson

Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University - Department of Accounting and Information Systems ( email )

Pamplin College of Business
Blacksburg, VA 24061
United States

Aiyesha Dey

Harvard Business School ( email )

Soldiers Field Road
Morgan 270C
Boston, MA 02163
United States

Abbie J. Smith (Contact Author)

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )

1101 East 58th Street
Graduate School of Business
Chicago, IL 60637-1561
United States
773-702-7295 (Phone)
773-702-0458 (Fax)

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