Committing the English and the Continental Way: An Experiment

18 Pages Posted: 7 Jun 2017

See all articles by Christoph Engel

Christoph Engel

Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods; University of Bonn - Faculty of Law & Economics; Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR), Erasmus School of Law, Rotterdam Institute of Law and Economics, Students; Universität Osnabrück - Faculty of Law

André Schmelzer

Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 6, 2017

Abstract

On the doctrinal surface, there is a deep divide between common and continental law when it comes to the origin of contractual obligations. Under continental law, in principle a unilateral promise suffices. Common law by contrast requires consideration. When it comes to deciding cases, the divide is much less pronounced. But for the most part the law does not govern people's lives through adjudication. It matches or moulds their moral intuitions. We test these intuitions in the lab. If consideration is required, participants believe that all participants make more ambitious promises. But they themselves make a more cautious promise. These two effects cancel out, so that promises are not more likely to be kept with consideration.

Keywords: contract, obligation, promise, consideration, experiment, modified dictator ga

JEL Classification: C91, D02, D03, D12, D64, H41, K12

Suggested Citation

Engel, Christoph and Schmelzer, André, Committing the English and the Continental Way: An Experiment (June 6, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2981720 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2981720

Christoph Engel (Contact Author)

Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ( email )

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University of Bonn - Faculty of Law & Economics

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Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR), Erasmus School of Law, Rotterdam Institute of Law and Economics, Students ( email )

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Universität Osnabrück - Faculty of Law

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André Schmelzer

Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ( email )

Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10
D-53113 Bonn, 53113
Germany

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