Revenue- Versus Spending-Based Fiscal Consolidation Announcements: Follow-Up, Multipliers and Confidence

60 Pages Posted: 10 Jul 2017 Last revised: 24 Mar 2020

See all articles by Roel M. W. J. Beetsma

Roel M. W. J. Beetsma

University of Amsterdam - Research Institute in Economics & Econometrics (RESAM); European Commission; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Tinbergen Institute; Netspar

Oana Furtuna

University of Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute

Massimo Giuliodori

University of Amsterdam - Faculty of Economics & Econometrics (FEE); Tinbergen Institute

Haroon Mumtaz

Queen Mary, University of London

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: July 2017

Abstract

Based on a newly-constructed narrative dataset on fiscal consolidation announcements for thirteen EU countries over the period 1978-2013, a panel VAR analysis shows that revenue-based consolidation announcements affect economic activity more adversely than do spending-based announcements. The combination of larger actual follow-up and larger revenue multipliers helps to explain the difference. The unique nature of our dataset allows to control for fiscal anticipation and the confidence channel following the announcements. The confidence channel has an important role in explaining the difference in the multipliers following the two types of announcements.

Keywords: confidence, fiscal consolidation announcements, Fiscal multipliers, follow-up, narrative identification, panel vector auto-regression

JEL Classification: E21, E62, H5

Suggested Citation

Beetsma, Roel M. W. J. and Furtuna, Oana and Giuliodori, Massimo and Mumtaz, Haroon, Revenue- Versus Spending-Based Fiscal Consolidation Announcements: Follow-Up, Multipliers and Confidence (July 2017). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP12133, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2999663

Roel M. W. J. Beetsma (Contact Author)

University of Amsterdam - Research Institute in Economics & Econometrics (RESAM) ( email )

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Oana Furtuna

University of Amsterdam ( email )

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Tinbergen Institute ( email )

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Massimo Giuliodori

University of Amsterdam - Faculty of Economics & Econometrics (FEE) ( email )

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Tinbergen Institute ( email )

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Haroon Mumtaz

Queen Mary, University of London ( email )

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