Management Ownership and Corporate Performance: an Empirical Analysis

32 Pages Posted: 9 Jun 2004 Last revised: 30 Jan 2013

See all articles by Randall Morck

Randall Morck

University of Alberta - Department of Finance and Statistical Analysis; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Asian Bureau of Finance and Economic Research

Andrei Shleifer

Harvard University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Robert W. Vishny

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: October 1986

Abstract

We investigate the relation between management ownership and corporate performance, as measured by Tobin's Q. In a cross-section of Fortune 500 firms, Tobin's Q first increases and then declines as board of directors holdings rise. For older firms there is weak evidence that Q is lower when a firm is run by a member of the founding family than when it is run by an officer unrelated to the founder.

Suggested Citation

Morck, Randall K. and Shleifer, Andrei and Vishny, Robert W., Management Ownership and Corporate Performance: an Empirical Analysis (October 1986). NBER Working Paper No. w2055, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=300160

Randall K. Morck (Contact Author)

University of Alberta - Department of Finance and Statistical Analysis ( email )

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Andrei Shleifer

Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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United States

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

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Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

Robert W. Vishny

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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