Stock Ownership Guidelines for CEOS: Do They (Not) Meet Expectations?

Posted: 2 Aug 2017

See all articles by Bradley W. Benson

Bradley W. Benson

Ball State University - Department of Finance and Insurance

Qin Lian

Portland State University

Qiming Wang

Willamette University - Atkinson Graduate School of Management

Date Written: 2016

Abstract

This paper examines the determinants and the effects of CEO stock ownership guideline adoption, differentiating Not-meet/Meet adopters – those setting the guideline above/below the CEO’s stock ownership at the time of adoption. While Meet adoption is mainly determined by factors related to stakeholder management, we find that Not-meet adoption is associated with factors related to both incentive alignment and stakeholder management. CEO ownership increases and CEO incentive alignment improves for Not-meet firms. But CEO ownership and incentives are unchanged for Meet firms following guideline adoption. We find no evidence that CEO compensation changes abnormally after adoption. Not-meet firms have larger improvement in operating performance and better stock performance than Meet firms. We provide evidence that the motives and the effects of guideline adoption depend on the level of the ownership restriction relative to the CEO’s ownership at the time of adoption.

Keywords: CEO Stock Ownership Guideline, Not-Meet Adoption, Meet Adoption, CEO Compensation, Incentive Alignment, Stakeholder Management, Financial Performance

JEL Classification: G34, J33, M52

Suggested Citation

Benson, Bradley W. and Lian, Qin and Wang, Qiming, Stock Ownership Guidelines for CEOS: Do They (Not) Meet Expectations? (2016). Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 69, 2016, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3011546

Bradley W. Benson

Ball State University - Department of Finance and Insurance ( email )

Muncie, IN 47306-0340
United States
765-285-5299 (Phone)
765-285-4314 (Fax)

Qin Lian (Contact Author)

Portland State University ( email )

United States
5037253728 (Phone)

Qiming Wang

Willamette University - Atkinson Graduate School of Management ( email )

900 State Street
Salem, OR 97301
United States

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