How (Not) to Run Auctions: The European 3g Telecom Auctions

24 Pages Posted: 11 Mar 2002

See all articles by Paul Klemperer

Paul Klemperer

University of Oxford - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: February 2002

Abstract

There were enormous differences in the revenues from the European 'third generation' (3G, or 'MTS') mobile-phone license auctions, from 20 Euros per capita in Switzerland to 650 Euros per capita in the UK, though the values of the licences sold were similar. Poor auction designs in some countries facilitated collusion between firms and failed to attract entrants. The sequencing of the auctions was also crucial. We discuss the auctions in the UK, Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Austria, Switzerland, Belgium, Greece and Denmark.

Keywords: Auctions, telecommunications, spectrum auctions, 3G, UMTS, bidding

JEL Classification: D44, L96

Suggested Citation

Klemperer, Paul, How (Not) to Run Auctions: The European 3g Telecom Auctions (February 2002). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3215. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=303763

Paul Klemperer (Contact Author)

University of Oxford - Department of Economics ( email )

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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

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