The Minimal Persuasive Effects of Campaign Contact in General Elections: Evidence from 49 Field Experiments

Forthcoming, American Political Science Review

Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 17-65

166 Pages Posted: 27 Sep 2017 Last revised: 28 Sep 2017

See all articles by Joshua Kalla

Joshua Kalla

University of California, Berkeley, Students

David E. Broockman

University of California, Berkeley - Department of Political Science

Date Written: September 25, 2017

Abstract

Significant theories of democratic accountability hinge on how political campaigns affect Americans’ candidate choices. We argue that the best estimate of the effects of campaign contact and advertising on Americans’ candidates choices in general elections is zero. First, a systematic meta-analysis of 40 field experiments estimates an average effect of zero in general elections. Second, we present nine original field experiments that increase the statistical evidence in the literature about the persuasive effects of personal contact 10-fold. These experiments’ average effect is also zero. In both existing and our original experiments, persuasive effects only appear to emerge in two rare circumstances. First, when candidates take unusually unpopular positions and campaigns invest unusually heavily in identifying persuadable voters. Second, when campaigns contact voters long before election day and measure effects immediately — although this early persuasion decays. These findings contribute to ongoing debates about how political elites influence citizens’ judgments.

Suggested Citation

Kalla, Joshua and Broockman, David E., The Minimal Persuasive Effects of Campaign Contact in General Elections: Evidence from 49 Field Experiments (September 25, 2017). Forthcoming, American Political Science Review, Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 17-65, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3042867

Joshua Kalla

University of California, Berkeley, Students ( email )

525 F. Haas School of Business
Berkeley, CA
United States

David E. Broockman (Contact Author)

University of California, Berkeley - Department of Political Science ( email )

210 Barrows Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.davidbroockman.com

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