Optimal Duration of Innovation Contests

40 Pages Posted: 10 Dec 2017 Last revised: 30 Aug 2020

See all articles by C. Gizem Korpeoglu

C. Gizem Korpeoglu

Eindhoven University of Technology

Ersin Körpeoğlu

University College London - School of Management

Sıdıka Tunç Candoğan

University College London - School of Management

Date Written: April 28, 2019

Abstract

We study the duration and the award scheme of an innovation contest where an organizer elicits solutions to an innovation-related problem from a group of agents. We use a game-theoretic model where the organizer decides on the contest duration and the award scheme while each agent decides on her participation, and determines her effort over the contest duration by considering potential changes in her productivity over time. The quality of an agent’s solution improves with her effort, but it is also subject to an output uncertainty. We show that the optimal contest duration increases as the relative impact of the agent uncertainty on her output increases, and it decreases if the agent productivity increases over time. These results suggest that the optimal contest duration increases with the novelty or sophistication of solutions that the organizer seeks, and it decreases when the organizer can offer support tools that can increase the agent productivity over time. More interestingly, we characterize an optimal award scheme, and show that giving multiple (almost always) unequal awards is optimal when the organizer’s urgency in obtaining solutions is below a certain threshold. We also show that this threshold is larger when the agent productivity increases over time. These results help explain why many contests on crowdsourcing platforms give multiple unequal awards. Finally, consistent with empirical findings, we show that there is a positive correlation between the optimal contest duration and the optimal total award.

Keywords: Award Scheme, Crowdsourcing, Deadline, Platform, Tournament

Suggested Citation

Korpeoglu, C. Gizem and Körpeoğlu, Ersin and Candoğan, Sıdıka Tunç, Optimal Duration of Innovation Contests (April 28, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3064763 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3064763

C. Gizem Korpeoglu (Contact Author)

Eindhoven University of Technology ( email )

PO Box 513
Eindhoven, 5600 MB
Netherlands

Ersin Körpeoğlu

University College London - School of Management ( email )

1 Canada Square Canary Wharf
London, E14 5AA
United Kingdom

Sıdıka Tunç Candoğan

University College London - School of Management ( email )

Gower Street
London, WC1E 6BT
United Kingdom

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