Ownership and Trade from Evolutionary Games

Posted: 5 Sep 2002

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Abstract

Two new evolutionary game models are presented where ownership and trade emerge from anarchy as evolutionary stable strategies. In these models, ownership status provides an endogenous asymmetrizing criterion enabling cheaper resolution of property conflicts.

Keywords: property, trade, evolutionary games, ownership, game theory, sociobiology, property rights

JEL Classification: K0,C7,C73,K1,K2,D7,L0,Z1,E11

Suggested Citation

Yee, Kenton K., Ownership and Trade from Evolutionary Games. International Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 183-197, 2003. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=319103

Kenton K. Yee (Contact Author)

Mellon Capital Management ( email )

50 Fremont Street, #3819
San Francisco, CA 94105
United States
415-975-3565 (Phone)

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
1,163
PlumX Metrics