Ownership and Trade from Evolutionary Games

Posted: 5 Sep 2002

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Abstract

Two new evolutionary game models are presented where ownership and trade emerge from anarchy as evolutionary stable strategies. In these models, ownership status provides an endogenous asymmetrizing criterion enabling cheaper resolution of property conflicts.

Keywords: property, trade, evolutionary games, ownership, game theory, sociobiology, property rights

JEL Classification: K0,C7,C73,K1,K2,D7,L0,Z1,E11

Suggested Citation

Yee, Kenton K., Ownership and Trade from Evolutionary Games. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=319103

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