(Presentation Slides) Do Short-Sellers Arbitrage the Accrual Anomaly?

47 Pages Posted: 21 Aug 2018

See all articles by David A. Hirshleifer

David A. Hirshleifer

University of California, Irvine - Paul Merage School of Business; NBER

Siew Hong Teoh

University of California, Irvine - Accounting Area

Jeff Jiewei Yu

University of Arizona

Date Written: June 15, 2010

Abstract

We find a positive association between short-selling and accruals during 1988-2009, and that asymmetry between the long and short sides of the accrual anomaly is stronger when constraints on short-arbitrage are more severe (low availability of loanable shares as proxied by institutional holdings). Short arbitrage occurs primarily among firms in the top accrual decile. Asymmetry is only present on NASDAQ. Thus, there is short arbitrage of the accrual anomaly, but short sale constraints limit its effectiveness.
Paper is available here: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1026044.

Keywords: accruals, anomalies, arbitrage, short sales, market efficiency

JEL Classification: M41, M43, G14, G10

Suggested Citation

Hirshleifer, David A. and Teoh, Siew Hong and Yu, Jeff Jiewei, (Presentation Slides) Do Short-Sellers Arbitrage the Accrual Anomaly? (June 15, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3228837 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3228837

David A. Hirshleifer (Contact Author)

University of California, Irvine - Paul Merage School of Business ( email )

Irvine, CA California 92697-3125
United States

HOME PAGE: http://sites.uci.edu/dhirshle/

NBER ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Siew Hong Teoh

University of California, Irvine - Accounting Area ( email )

Irvine, CA 92697-3125
United States

Jeff Jiewei Yu

University of Arizona ( email )

Department of History
Tucson, AZ 85721
United States
520-621-1273 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://accounting.eller.arizona.edu/people/jeff-jiewei-yu

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